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Abstract: Recent reporting has identified significant threats to the U.S. energy’s critical 
infrastructure from nation states and other groups through cyberspace. Efforts to improve the 
security and resilience of U.S. energy infrastructure relies upon voluntary partnerships between 
the U.S. Government and public and private energy infrastructure owners. This paper examines 
ideal Public-Private Partnership (PPP) characteristics and compares them to an actual PPP in 
the U.S. The results identify strengths of and challenges to efforts to secure U.S. energy 
infrastructure. The research was conducted through a combination of literature reviews and 
interviews with a sample of U.S-government and private-energy infrastructure representatives. 
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Introduction 
Security of the United States’ critical infrastructure (CI) is at risk from both physical and cyber 
threats. Cyber legislation, directing the protection of United States’ CI, has been a subject of 
continuous scrutiny over the last few years. For example, due to Congress’ inability to agree upon 
specific legislation, the President signed Executive Order 13636 (2013) and Presidential Policy 
Directive (PPD) 21 (2013). The intent was to enhance protection, security, and resiliency of our CI 
through collaborative efforts between federal agencies, public-private owners, and operators of 
critical infrastructure using existing federal authorities. The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) was designated the lead for coordinating security of the nation’s CI. The means by which 
DHS intended to accomplish this responsibility was primarily through public-private partnerships 
(PPP) and voluntary programs. 
 
There has been great effort between government, public, and private organizations to coordinate 
the way forward, while establishing programs to secure our CI. The fragmentation of CI due to 
privatization and, moreover, deregulation makes overall security that much more difficult and 
cumbersome (De Bruijne & Van Eeten 2007). De Bruijne and Van Eeten (2007) go on to state, 
“Instead of one or comparatively few public organizations cooperating under hierarchical 
command and control, large networks of organizations with competing interests became involved 
in the management of CIs and the reliable provision of services”. Therefore, the government must 
rely upon complex and often fragmented PPPs to secure our CI. 
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Executive Order 13636 (2013) identified 16 critical infrastructure sectors spanning multiple U.S. 
areas from energy, financial services, and communications to transportations systems, dams, and 
the defense industrial base. Of particular concern is the energy infrastructure, the most critical CI, 
which is a fundamental component of the remaining fifteen critical infrastructure sectors. The 
DHS’s Energy Sector Overview webpage states that the U.S. electricity sector “contains more than 
6,413 power plants” with “more than 80 percent of the country's energy infrastructure owned by 
the private sector” (DHS 2014a). Not long ago, the energy grid was physically and virtually 
separated from the Internet. The ‘smart grid’ is “basically the system of control, computer, 
communication, and automation technologies that will allow a rapid response to rapidly changing 
grid conditions” (Kaster & Sen 2014). From a business perspective, it has become more effective 
and efficient to utilize capabilities that can monitor and transmit data regarding the status of energy 
production and distribution. The upside is that the electricity segment of the energy sector is one 
of the only CI sectors with mandatory cyber security standards (Zhang 2013). However, a 2013 
report from the United States Congress found that 74 of 85 (87%) reporting utilities complied with 
a list of North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) mandated security measures, but 
only 13 of 36 (36%) implemented voluntary measures against the same threat (Kaster & Sen 2014). 
From a security standpoint, a much greater risk exists because of the interdependencies within the 
grid and an increased risk from potential cascading effects (Massoud & Wollenberg 2005). 
 
Regardless of the existing partnerships, there remains a philosophical difference between the 
government, which is focused on the security of CI, and private owners and operators, whose focus 
is on business continuity, efficiency, and profit (Dunn-Cavelty & Suter 2009).  The purpose of this 
study is to synthesize the concepts of the ideal PPP to provide context and to allow a comparative 
analysis of how the government is executing the partnership to secure the energy grid in order to 
identify areas of success and areas of heightened risk. First, what makes successful PPPs are 
reviewed; this review is followed by a review and assessment of current PPPs used by the DHS 
and DOE to protect the U.S.’s energy infrastructure. Finally, impediments and opportunities to 
improve overall U.S. energy sector cybersecurity are identified. 
 
Likelihood of a Cyberattack on U.S Power Infrastructure 
In recent years, a significant increase in cyber exploitation and attacks directed against the United 
States and abroad has occurred. In July 2012, General Keith Alexander, then Director of the 
National Security Agency and Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, stated that there was a 17-fold 
increase in cyberattacks on American infrastructure from 2009 to 2011, which were initiated by 
criminal gangs, hackers, and other nation states (Sanger & Schmitt 2012). This concern was 
reinforced in November 2014 when the Director of the National Security Agency, Admiral Mike 
Rogers, testified to the House (Select) Intelligence Committee that 
 
there shouldn't be any doubt in our minds that there are nation-states and groups out there that have the 
capability to do that, to enter our systems, to enter those industrial control systems, and to shut down, 
forestall our ability to operate our basic infrastructure, whether it's generating power across this nation, 
whether it's moving water and fuel. (NSA 2014) 
 
This vulnerability is illustrated in the following examples of the effect cyber tools can have on 
critical infrastructure. First, there is the STUXNET worm, which affected Iran's nuclear 
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development capabilities in 2010. STUXNET caused a malfunction that was invisible to human 
operators because the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) screens in the control 
room suggested normal operation. In this case, the worm was aimed solely at industrial equipment 
made by Siemens that controls oil pipelines, electric utilities, nuclear facilities, and other large 
industrial sites (Sanger 2010). Second is the SHAMOON virus directed against Saudi Arabian Oil 
Company (ARAMCO) in 2012. SHAMOON spread throughout the company's network and 
affected as many as 30,000 computers. In addition to affecting ARAMCO, the virus spread and 
was found on the system of RasGas, a Qatari owned liquefied natural gas company (Nakashima 
2013). Third, is the hack of a German steel mill as reported by the German Federal Office for 
Information Security in 2014 (BBC News 2014). Attackers targeted emails using a ‘spear phishing’ 
technique to obtain log-in information, which gave them access to critical production systems at 
the mill leading to massive damage. 
 
The previous cases represent a small example of the potential damage a cyberattack can have on 
critical systems and networks. With the reliance the U.S. places on critical infrastructure, a 
deliberate cyberattack directed against the United States’ energy infrastructure could have a 
devastating impact on the country and on the economy. Understanding this new reality, collective 
situational awareness must be insured, critical infrastructure must be protected, and efficient 
mitigation measures must be established to minimize effects generated by a cyberattack on the 
nation’s CI. Given these examples and challenges, the authors next review the current literature on 
PPP for ways to improve the situation. 
 
Ideal Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Characteristics 
After reviewing the extant literature on PPPs (Mohr & Spekman 1994; DHS 2013a; Dunn-Cavelty 
& Suter 2009; Das & Bing-Sheng 1998; Bovaird 2004; Rufin & Rivera-Santos 2012; Ring & Van 
de Ven 1992) two models for successful partnerships that have support from multiple types of PPPs 
were identified. Table 1, below, depicts the two models and their associated characteristics 
identified for successful PPPs. It is clear that the models have both similarities and differences. 
After comparing the models it was determined that trust and information sharing are the two 
common characteristics. The existence of these attributes implies that both partners acknowledge 
their mutual dependence and their willingness to work for the survival of the relationship. Should 
one party act opportunistically, the relationship will suffer and both will feel the negative 
consequences  (Mohr & Spekman 1994). Cheating, distorting information, and misleading partners 
are examples of opportunistic behaviour in alliances, which is a cause for the relatively high rate 
of failure of alliances (Das & Bing-Sheng 1998). 
 
Mohr & Spekman 
(1994) 
Department of Homeland Security (2013a) 
Trust: The belief that a party's word is 
reliable and that a party will fulfil its 
obligation in an exchange.  
Trusted Environment: Environment where 
partners can continue to collaborate despite any 
differences in organizational structure, culture, 
motivation, and other factors that could easily 
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lead to conflict. 
Commitment: Willingness of trading 
partners to exert effort on behalf of the 
relationship. 
Appropriate Membership: Having the 
involvement of the major parties that shape the 
security and resilience environment of critical 
infrastructure. 
Coordination: Related to boundary 
definition and reflective of the set of tasks 
each party expects the other to perform. 
Defined Purpose: Partners must have a 
common interest to form an effective 
partnership. 
Interdependence: Acknowledgement that 
each is dependent on the other. 
Articulated Goals: Generally based on specific 
risk or risk-management considerations (or the 
need to build greater capability to fill a security 
gap) and should be developed jointly among 
partners. 
Communication Behaviour: 
     - Quality: Includes such aspects as the 
accuracy, timeliness, adequacy, and 
credibility of information exchanged. 
     - Information Sharing: Extent to which 
critical, often propriety, information is 
communicated to one's partner. 
     - Participation: Extent to which partners 
engage jointly in planning and goal 
setting. 
Robust Communication: Refers to 
relationships, processes, and channels for 
sharing perspectives and information, and 
engendering open conversation.  
Conflict Resolution Techniques: Given that 
a certain amount of conflict is expected, an 
understanding of how such conflict is 
resolved. 
Clear Governance: Clearly defining and 
documenting expectations, as well as roles and 
responsibilities and related decision-making 
ground rules and protocols. 
Leadership Involvement: Successful public-
private partnerships are guided by strong and 
consistent leadership from all participants.  
Measurable Outcomes: Well-designed outputs 
which can represent progress and provide 
results to management and external 
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stakeholders that sustain the commitment of 
time and resources.  
Table 1: Model comparison (shading depicts similarities) 
 
Organizations and individuals enter into partnerships to establish strategic relationships with others 
who share similar goals, but rely upon each other to accomplish their objectives. Without these 
relationships the objectives could not accomplished (Mohr & Spekman 1994; Rufin & Rivera-
Santos 2012). However, PPPs are not always the answer. Bovaird (2004) states, 
 
a major problem of partnership approach to public issues is that it brings fragmentation of structures 
and processes, which in turn leads to blurring of responsibilities and of accountability…yet there is no 
direct mechanism by which these partnerships can be held accountable in a proper fashion. 
 
Based on the research, it appears that trust is the foundational building block that all successful 
PPPs are built upon. Because PPPs are generally less hierarchal and more consensus-focused, 
partners within a PPP rely heavily upon trust for execution of tasks, exchange of information, and 
limiting opportunistic behaviors. Ring and Van de Ven (1992) identify “two definitions [of trust] 
frequently used in literature: (1) confidence or predictability in one's expectations and (2) 
confidence in the other's goodwill”. Rufin and Rivera-Santos (2012) assert “that interpartner trust 
in PPPs would greatly facilitate interactions. Yet our reasoning suggests that the difficulty to build 
trust in a PPP is such that partners are likely to rely on formal procedures rather than on trust”. 
Generally, trust may be based on norms of equity which define the degree to which one party judges 
that another party will fulfil its commitments and that the relationship is equitable (Ring & Van de 
Ven 1992). 
 
Often PPPs lack familiarity with their partners due to differing goals, organizational processes, and 
cultures, which can affect the trust factor. The degree to which trust may be created between the 
partners is thus extremely limited (Rufin & Rivera-Santos 2012). In addition, the potential exists 
that any or all partners may enter the PPP with pre-existing biases and mistrust due to previous 
interactions and partnership efforts. Trust affects how leaders view risk to their own companies and 
corporations. How much risk a company or corporation is willing to take depends upon whether 
the risks are within or outside their span of control. According to Dunn-Cavelty and Suter (2009), 
“The fundamental problem is that trust can only be developed through collaboration which in turn 
also depends on trust”. Closer ties result in more frequent and more relevant information exchanges 
between high performing partners (Huber & Daft 1987). 
 
Communication and sharing of information, the second common characteristic, is essential to 
ensuring that defense and protective measures are effective. The new-found reliance upon the 
Internet for connectivity to monitor and to track the status of the energy grid is paramount, yet the 
same reliance makes users more vulnerable to greater lasting effects if attacked. The assumption is 
that this interdependence generates a shared risk to the entire PPP. Therefore, partners must have 
confidence that the information shared is used for the intended purpose and is accurate, timely, and 
actionable. Mohr and Spekman (1994) make the case that information sharing is a component to 
overall communication behaviour. They contend that this behaviour consists of communication 
quality, information sharing, and participation. This suggests that quality and pertinent data are 
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more likely to improve open and honest lines of communication, to establish credibility, and to 
increase overall trust among the partners. From a business perspective, information may have direct 
consequences for profits and future ventures if compromised or handle inappropriately. For 
example, information exchange, if used improperly or shared with the wrong audience, can bring 
about lawsuits due to breaches of civil liberties or negligent release of personal information. 
However, when the government and public and private industry share information, it demonstrates 
their willingness to cooperate and coordinate to achieve common goals and purpose. 
 
With greater interdependency comes increased reliance upon coordination and cooperation to 
protect and secure the energy sector. Das and Bing-Shen (1998) define partner cooperation as the 
willingness of a partner to pursue mutually compatible interests in the alliance rather than to act 
opportunistically. In other words, partners work towards a common goal and purpose. Coordination 
and cooperation will only be achieved if the PPP has common objectives and goals and if partners 
consider it beneficial to business continuity. However, commitment is required at all levels of the 
PPP. Because more committed partners will exert effort and will balance short-term problems with 
long-term goal achievement, higher levels of commitment are expected to be associated with 
partnership success (Mohr & Spekman 1994). Mohr and Spekman (1994) also suggest that trust, 
the willingness to coordinate activities, and the ability to convey a sense of commitment to the 
relationship are keys to success. At times, cooperation among partners may be in competition with 
business operations and profitability. When this occurs, the latter is most likely to take priority and 
result in a failed PPP. 
 
The most research attention has been on PPP governance methods. First, the issue of governance 
and oversight required to support PPPs must be considered. There are many forms of governance; 
however, Dunn-Cavelty and Suter (2009) identify two primary forms of governance: the “network 
approach” and the “neoliberal approach”. The latter refers to the assumption that the “state” 
precisely defines and contractually stipulates how the tasks delegated to the companies must be 
fulfilled, all while maintaining control and intervening if the private sector fails to meet its 
obligations. “Network approach” describes the middle ground between the neoliberal and a “hands 
off” approach. In this method, the government becomes a coordinator, and thereby ensures that 
tasks are met by the network providers while relegating control to the individual private owners. 
This is done by way of an established framework and by using different types of instruments at 
their disposal as an enforcement mechanism. Instruments are tools to compel compliance or 
completion of the required tasks and standards and can take the form of loans, subsidies, or tax 
relief, to name a few. Without a hierarchal command and control structure, governance and 
oversight must be considered as a part of the PPP (Dunn-Cavelty & Suter 2009). 
 
In this section the major characteristics for a successful PPP have been identified. However, there 
are characteristics identified in Table 1, above, that were not essential for PPP success. For 
example, leader involvement, distribution of tasks, and measurable outcomes were deemed 
important by some, but they are merely sub-characteristics of the four primary characteristics (trust, 
information sharing, mutual goals and purpose, and coordination and cooperation) noted earlier. 
Regardless of whether the partnership demonstrates the above characteristics, the primary focus of 
private owners and operators is on business operations. If business operations are affected, profits 
due to the PPP will also be affected and then the partnership will likely fail. Therefore, the partners 
have to believe that the risk of not supporting the PPP outweighs the potential long-term effect on 
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the company's mission and profitability. 
 
Actual Model in Practice  
Based on the review of the processes and procedures established by the government and by the 
private sector, it is clear that there has been considerable effort towards establishing PPPs to secure 
the nation's critical infrastructure. In the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010) (GAO), 
all of the organizations identified trust as the essential underlying element to successful 
relationships and said that trust could be built only over time and, primarily, through personal 
relationships. The government has established multiple mechanisms to coordinate, collaborate, and 
share information; however, there are few mechanisms deliberately targeting trust and relationship 
building within the partnership. In an effort to mitigate this concern, DHS has employed the Critical 
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) legal protections and has established the 
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program to enhance that level of trust (DHS 
2013a). However, building trust typically occurs over time, is often personality driven, and requires 
appropriate mechanisms to facilitate these types of relationships. Barring any radical changes to 
U.S. law granting DHS and DOE greater authority, the government's only option to establish a 
successful PPP is by establishing and building trust within and among the PPP. Based on the 
research, the most pointed measure to determine if trust exists within the PPP is the willingness to 
share sensitive information between the government and private sector. 
 
To improve overall communication and coordination of the protection efforts, DHS established 
Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) and Government Coordinating Councils (GCC) to address 
sector-specific protection and resilience (DHS 2014b). Additionally, specific to the energy sector 
are the ES-ISAC, Energy GCC, Energy Sub-Sector (Electricity and Oil and Natural Gas) SCCs, 
and others. Figure 1, below, depicts a combination of these entities, multiple sub-sector ISACs, 
and programs such as DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network—Critical Infrastructure 
(HSIN-CI) and Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program—and demonstrates 
the government’s commitment to protecting its CI. Effective coordination among the partners can 
mitigate duplicative efforts and can minimize the resources required to correct or to mitigate a 
problem that may arise. According to Frangopoulos, Eloff and Venter (2015), “economic 
considerations are being used in the process of risk assessment, usually to define an organization's 
‘risk appetite’ and  lead to informed decisions regarding the implementation of security measures”. 
This is particularly important when issues such as research and development (R&D), building the 
necessary workforce, and establishing technical standards across a wide variety of networks are 
being considered. 
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Figure 1: Energy sector overview (representative only) 
 
 
With the establishment of these numerous entities, programs, and processes, findings from a 2013 
GAO report were particularly troubling. In this report, the U.S. GAO (2013) found that the lack of 
a centralized information-sharing system continues to hinder progress. The National Cybersecurity 
and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and the ES-ISAC were designed to be those 
central clearing houses for sharing information for the overall U.S. CI sector and the energy sector, 
respectively. Private industry expects access to sensitive or classified information regarding cyber 
threats that is useable, timely, and accurate and must also have a means of sharing the information 
securely (GAO 2010). The process which the government uses to downgrade or to declassify 
information is time consuming and “unfortunately, too often the information that is shared is not 
considered to be of sufficient quality, nor is it sufficiently actionable” (DHS 2013b). Laws, 
regulations, and policy regarding the over classification, declassification, and sharing of 
information precludes timely dissemination of threat information from the government to the 
private sector. Incidents similar to Snowden's release of top-secret National Security Agency 
(NSA) surveillance practices and the discovery of NSA's PRISM program do not benefit the 
government's case with the protection of shared information; moreover, such discoveries justify the 
private owners’ and operators’ reasons for concern. 
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Information sharing is not solely for sharing threat information, but it also includes communicating 
goals, objectives, and future plans. Mutual goals provide partners a common understanding of 
expectations which should be accomplished along the way. In the NIPP, the DHS identifies its 
vision, mission, and objectives and describes its goals as a national unity of effort to secure the 
nation's CI. This vision and objectives document  
 
was developed through a collaborative process that included the active participation of the critical 
infrastructure community, including private industry; public and private sector owners and operators; 
state, local, tribal, and territorial government agencies; non-governmental organizations; sector-specific 
agencies; and other federal departments and agencies. (DHS 2013b) 
 
However, specific goals for each sub-sector are established via the previously mentioned GCCs, 
and SCCs and are codified in Sector-Specific Plans (SSP)/Charters. The energy sector, in 
coordination with private owners and operators, developed its own goals in its 2010 SSP (DOE 
2010). The goals are sector-specific and build upon the overall DHS goals. DHS noted in its 
assessment that “selecting and working toward clear, relevant, tangible and achievable goals create 
unity of effort and motivate partners” (2013a). The report added that “too often, though, there 
appears to be a difference between the sector partnerships’ goals and objectives, and the actual risk 
management programs developed by stakeholders” (DHS 2013a).  
 
Research suggests that a key consideration is that the private partner must believe that the risk of 
not supporting the PPP outweighs the potential long-term effect on the company's mission and 
profitability. This only occurs when the partnership's purpose and benefit are greater than the 
individual need. Through the PPP, the government and private sectors are to work in tandem to 
create the context, framework, and support for coordination and information-sharing activities 
required to implement and sustain a specific sector’s critical infrastructure protection efforts (GAO 
2013). The Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community C³ Voluntary Program is a great example. It 
provides the coordination point within the federal government for critical-infrastructure owners 
and operators interested in improving their cyber-risk-management processes. The C³ Voluntary 
Program aims to: 1) support industry in increasing its cyber resilience, 2) increase awareness and 
use of the Framework, and 3) encourage organizations to manage cybersecurity as part of an all-
hazards approach to enterprise risk management (DHS 2015). 
 
Although not identified as critical to the success of the PPP or to achieving the mission or end state 
of the partnership, some level of governance is required to protect the energy sector CI. Executive 
Order 13636 (2013) explicitly states that  
 
this order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of 
appropriations. Nothing in this order shall be construed to provide an agency with authority for 
regulating the security of critical infrastructure in addition to or to a greater extent than the authority the 
agency has under existing law. Nothing in this order shall be construed to alter or limit any authority or 
responsibility of an agency under existing law. 
 
Essentially, all private owners’ and operators’ activities are voluntary, which makes enforcement 
nearly impossible. The U.S. government takes a laissez-faire approach to CI protection. However, 
because of current laws and regulations, DHS has few options to direct the protection of the nation’s 
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CI. In the end, there are a number of federal, state, local, and private organizations involved in 
energy CI protection and regulation including the DHS, DOE, FERC, NERC, NIST, state, local, 
and private utility commissions and boards (Hébert 2013). 
 
Telephone interviews with local and federal representatives associated with the protection of U.S. 
energy infrastructure were conducted. Interviews were conducted between 27 March and 6 April 
2015 with local and federal energy representatives. All interviewees requested to remain 
anonymous due to the fact that they were not authorized to speak on behalf of their organizations. 
The information provided is considered personal opinion based on the observations during 
execution of daily duties. The interview questions (see Appendix 1, below) focused on the 
elements of the PPP that are being executed successfully and the areas in which the PPP needs to 
improve. During the interview with a federal government agency representative responsible for 
coordinating the protection of the nation's CI, it was stated that trust is critical to the success and is 
reliant upon personal relationships established at the lowest levels. According to the interviewee, 
trust at the local level took a long time to establish and is working quite well. However, trust does 
not automatically exist from the local level up to the government agencies. This affects all aspects 
of the partnership at the local, regional, and national levels. Much of the interaction between 
government and private sector is via the energy infrastructure of state and local associations 
because of the large number of ES CI owners and operators. It was said that not only do private 
owners and operators not trust the government, but also federal energy agencies are reluctant to 
share identified vulnerabilities with the ES community in fear that the information will become 
public knowledge. Similar issues arise when the private sector releases potentially damaging 
information to the government, which may have a damaging impact on company reputation, 
privacy, and civil liberties. Legal and corporate barriers discourage sharing of data that may impact 
the company's reputation. While the larger corporations are more likely to participate, the smaller 
companies are not incorporated into this information-sharing mechanism due to resource 
constraints and lack of awareness, thus resulting in increased risks to their networks.  
 
This sentiment was reinforced during a discussion with a local power company representative. He 
praised the positive efforts DHS, DOE, and public and private owners and operators have made 
over recent years. However, the representative stated that the most problematic issues are poor 
relationships and lack of communication between the government agencies and private industries. 
At the local level, personal relationships exist, but this is not reflected at the upper level. He 
admitted that, although his company receives and acts upon warnings and reports from the ES-
ISAC, NCCIC, and other organizations, these organizations deliberately do not reciprocate by 
sharing company information with the government. The concern is the same—they fear that the 
information will not be handled appropriately. He praised the government’s willingness to provide 
vulnerability assessments and added that it was beneficial to the company’s protection efforts. He 
also acknowledged his company's participation in the SCC and collaboration with the regulatory 
bodies to assist with standards development. He expressed doubt that smaller energy providers 
were aware of many of the government's efforts and that they lacked the resources to provide 
increased cybersecurity measures. Lastly, the opinion of the representative was that, to effectively 
protect the energy sector, the government will eventually have to make many of the voluntary 
programs mandatory with incentivized participation to ensure compliance with established 
cybersecurity standards. 
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Similarly, a representative from the ES-ISAC agreed that the lack of information sharing, due in 
large part to the lack of trust in the government agencies, is the primary obstacle to protecting the 
energy infrastructure. Public and private companies are concerned that information shared with the 
ES-ISAC, which is funded by the FERC and the regulatory body for the energy CI, will be used 
against the reporting company. It was further stated that the government, as a whole, must do a 
better job to teach and to educate the community of interest in order to improve the relationships 
and to ease the concerns of the public and private partners. The representative, however, did say 
that much progress has transpired over the years and that the current membership consists of over 
1900 regulated energy companies and over 4000 non-regulated companies. The overall increase in 
membership suggests the possibility of improved relationships generally. This is great progress, 
but there is still a long way to go in improving the overall situational awareness and cybersecurity 
of our energy CI. 
 
Conclusion/Implications 
One conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that technology will only increase, and this 
includes the energy grid. Electric grid owners and operators will continue to rely on smart 
technology to provide power to the nation and to increase overall efficiency while simultaneously 
increasing our already prevalent vulnerabilities. Based on research and interviews, PPPs within the 
energy sector have begun to establish trusting relationships, but primarily in smaller groups 
(individual to individual) and not consistently across the entire energy sector. Academic, 
government, and industry reports agree that relationships must be improved. Given the ideal 
characteristics and what is actually occurring as introduced earlier, the following suggestions are 
made: 
 
First and foremost there should be mechanisms for ensuring: 1) all partners are informed of the 
threats and recommended actions, and 2) standards are complied with in order to mitigate 
vulnerabilities and threats. The energy sector, as well as the broader U.S. CI, is only as strong as 
the weakest link. Markey and Waxman (2013) illustrate this concern: 
 
of those that responded to the question regarding compliance with mandatory STUXNET standards, 
91% of investor-owned utilities (IOU), 83% of municipally- or cooperatively-owned utilities, and 
80% of federal entities that own major pieces of the bulk power system reported compliance. By 
contrast, of those that responded to a separate question regarding compliance with voluntary 
STUXNET measures, only 21% of IOUs, 44% of municipally- or cooperatively-owned utilities, and 
62.5% of federal entities reported compliance. 
 
The key takeaway is that the mandatory standards, directed by the FERC, were inconsistently 
followed. If mandatory standards are not implemented across the sector, how can there be assurance 
that voluntary programs, actions, and activities will effectively protect energy CI? 
 
Second, the DOE should reassess the best approach for coordinating the protection of energy CI. 
Building trust within the partnership is the single characteristic within the PPP, which everything 
else hinges upon. This requires a deliberate and concerted effort working closely with public and 
private owners and operators at all levels to improve overall awareness. This starts by increasing 
participation in voluntary programs by educating the public and private sector of programs, 
processes, and available support mechanisms. Also, incentivizing and rewarding participation is 
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essential as long as the legislation fails to provide additional authorities to the DHS. There have 
been discussions and research efforts to address increased participation for protection of energy CI, 
using incentives and rewards; however, implementation of such measures has failed to materialize. 
 
Third, the government needs to provide the public-private sector with liability protection for 
voluntarily sharing critical information. This gets to the heart of the concern regarding sharing 
information from the private sector. The fear of sharing sensitive information opens the 
organization up to civil suits affecting reputations and profits. Public and private owners and 
operators need assurance that information shared between the private sector and government will 
be treated in accordance with established laws and regulations. For example, they must be confident 
that information shared by private owners with the ES-ISAC, which is funded by the FERC, will 
not result in fines or penalties by the FERC. 
 
Fourth, the U.S. Government should establish a national cybersecurity strategy to protect critical 
infrastructure. The energy sector faces a wide variety of regulation, guidance, and policies from 
local, state, and federal agencies. This guidance sometimes clashes or is not in line with the 
company’s business plans and operations, which may drive limited implementation of the 
cybersecurity guidance affecting overall cybersecurity risk. A national cybersecurity strategy 
would serve as the source guidance and would drive the development and content within all 
subordinate agency-level guidance documents. This would provide a mechanism to ensure all plans 
are nested and consistent to minimize confusion among the community of interest. Therefore, it is 
crucial for DHS, DOE, regulatory agencies, and for the private owners and operators to work 
together to clearly identify and to update all plans and policies to ensure consistency throughout 
the energy sector. 
 
Lastly, authorities and oversight must be addressed in future legislation. DHS, DOE, and other 
agencies lack the authority to establish, to direct, and to enforce compliance with cybersecurity 
standards. Without requisite authority, the government's approach to protect the energy 
infrastructure is banking on public and private companies to do the right thing. Proper authority 
would allow the DHS or DOE to initiate deliberate steps to establish, to direct, and to compel 
compliance and to enforce cybersecurity standards across the energy critical infrastructure. The 
electric grid and associated infrastructure are too important to hope for cybersecurity. 
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Appendix 1 – Interview Questions 
1. What traits do you believe are most critical for a successful PPP? 
2. What traits do you believe are currently working well in the protection of our energy 
infrastructure? Please explain your response. 
3. What traits do you believe are not being executed well in the protection of our energy 
infrastructure and why?  
i. In your opinion, how would you improve these traits? 
4. In your opinion, how do organizations and government agencies establish mutual trust?  
i. Do you feel that there is trust between your organization and the private or government 
agencies responsible for coordinating the protection of energy critical infrastructure? 
Explain. 
5. How would you rate the partnership and your organization's willingness to: 
i. Participate with the DHS/DOE or public/private sector (whatever is applicable) regarding 
energy infrastructure protection? 
ii. Coordinate with the DHS/DOE or public/private sector (whatever is applicable) regarding 
energy infrastructure protection? 
iii. Cooperate with the DHS/DOE or public/private sector (whatever is applicable) regarding 
energy infrastructure protection? 
6. How often does your organization coordinate/collaborate with government agencies and other 
public/private energy infrastructure owners & operators regarding security and protection 
issues?  
i. How is it accomplished (e.g., venues, groups, etc.)? 
7. How would you assess the partnership and your organization's willingness to share information 
regarding vulnerabilities, intrusions etc.? 
8. How is information shared between your organization and the government or public/private 
sector (whatever is applicable)?  
i. What mechanisms are in place to share information regarding current, imminent, or 
potential threats? 
ii. Are the processes and mechanisms different based on imminence of the threat? 
iii. How is threat information received? 
9. Describe to me the oversight and/or supervision of protection and security efforts?  
i. What is the leadership structure as it relates to protecting critical energy infrastructure? 
10. The U.S. strategy for protecting our critical infrastructure relies primarily on public-private 
voluntary participation. What is your opinion on this approach and is it effective? 
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